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WHO ARE “CLIENTS”?
(AND WHY IT MATTERS)
Allan C. Hutchinson*
“A client is to me a mere unit, a factor in a problem”
— Arthur Conan Doyle, Sr.
Although the lawyer-client relationship is fundamental to the lawyer’s ethical and
legal role, there has been little close attention paid to defining exactly who
“clients” are. This article explores the shifting and multi-dimensional nature of
the lawyer-client relationship. Consistent with the aspirational and pragmatic
function of law and practice that underlies legal ethics and professional
responsibility, the article argues there is no ideal taxonomy for categorizing
“clients” and the obligations owed them. The identity of a client is neither fast nor
fixed, and lawyers are subject to a spectrum of differing ethical duties and legal
obligations that can vary in weight and effect with the context. The article explores
the general duties and obligations lawyers have to members of society,
notwithstanding any client-based relationship with an individual; identifies the
circumstances in which people become “current clients” and the special legal and
moral obligations that come into play; discusses the duties and obligations that
continue when, and if, clients cease to have a formal and/or continuing
relationship with their lawyers; and examines the particular complexities involved
when lawyers deal with groups or organisations.

Copyright © 2006 by Allan C. Hutchinson.
* Distinguished Research Professor and Associate Dean (Research and Graduate
Studies), Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. I am grateful to Michael
Carabash, Ron Podolny, and members of my Osgoode Legal Ethics Seminar in Winter 2006
for their critical comments and helpful suggestions.
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Bien que la relation avocat-client soit au centre du rôle éthique et juridique d’un
avocat, très peu d’attention à la définition exacte d’un « client » a été apportée.
Cet article explore la nature changeante et multidimensionnelle de la relation
avocat-client. En accord avec les aspirations et les fonctions pragmatiques du
droit et de la pratique, qui sous-tendent la déontologie juridique et la
responsabilité professionnelle, l’article maintient qu’il n’existe pas de taxonomie
idéale pour catégoriser les « clients » et les responsabilités de leur avocat envers
eux. L’identité d’un client n’est pas un concept rigide ou définitif et les avocats
doivent jongler avec une multitude de responsabilités juridiques et de devoirs
éthiques concurrents dont le poids et l’incidence varient selon le contexte.
L’article explore les responsabilités et les obligations générales d’un avocat
envers les citoyens, indépendamment de la relation avocat-client qu’il entretient
avec une personne en particulier, dégage les circonstances dans lesquelles une
personne devient un « client actuel » ainsi que les obligations légales et morales
qui interviennent, commente les responsabilités et les obligations qui sont
maintenues envers le client lorsque cesse la relation officielle ou continue avec
l’avocat et examine la complexité particulière des interactions de l’avocat avec les
groupes et les organisations.

In most discussions of legal ethics and professional responsibility, it is
taken for granted that the main focus of critical attention is the relationship
between lawyers and their clients. While lawyers do owe other duties to
other people and institutions, it is the client to whom they have their
greatest and most pressing obligations. As such, the lawyer-client
relationship is at the dynamic heart of a lawyer’s ethical and legal role.
However, little close attention has been paid to exactly who “clients” are
— when does a person or organisation assume that role and receive the
benefits that are presumed to accrue from that identity? Of course, the
answers to this question matter greatly. While it is essential to identify who
is and who is not a client as the triggering event for most legal and ethical
responsibilities, it is also important to emphasise that lawyers’ legal and
ethical obligations do not start and finish with clients; there are definite
obligations to non-clients. Moreover, although the primary relationship is
that between lawyers and their clients, the duties to which it gives rise are
not absolute; they are foundational and fundamental, but they are not allconsuming.
There is a spectrum of differing ethical duties and legal obligations
imposed on lawyers which will sometimes vary in weight and effect with
the informing and practical context. As recent developments make clear,
the identity of a client is far from fast or fixed. The landscape of
professional responsibility has become populated by a variety of characters
and caricatures, including current clients, former clients, quasi-clients,
non-clients and organisational clients. It is a veritable dramatis personae
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who morph in and out of their different identities and occasionally hold
more than one personality at a time. Consequently, in thinking about legal
ethics and responsibilities, it is prudent to treat the lawyer-client
relationship as a shifting and multi-dimensional connection. If it were a
light switch, it would be more of the dimmer variety than the traditional
on/off kind.
It will be the burden of this short essay to explore and chart that
complex and dynamic social drama. In doing so, my focus will be on the
interactions between lawyers and others so as to demonstrate how the
identity of others affects and shapes the particular duties that lawyers have
towards them. As such, the analysis is intended to be more suggestive than
exhaustive; reference to doctrine and rules will be topical and illustrative
in nature, not comprehensive in scope. In the first part of the essay, I
explore the general duties and obligations lawyers have to members of
society, notwithstanding any client-based relationship with an individual.
Next, I canvass the circumstances in which people become “current
clients” and the special legal and moral obligations that then come into
play between them. The third part looks to the duties and obligations that
continue when, and if, clients cease to have a formal and/or continuing
relationship with their lawyers. Finally, I examine the particular difficulties
that can and do arise when lawyers deal with groups or organisations.
Throughout the essay, I will cut across the various ethical duties and legal
responsibilities placed upon lawyers. Indeed, it would be folly to suggest
that there is some ideal taxonomic discipline that can be brought to bear on
thinking about “clients” and the obligations owed them. To imagine
otherwise is to misunderstand the aspirational and pragmatic function of
the law and practice, which comprises legal ethics and professional
responsibility.1 Ethics as much as, and often more than, law will always be
a vigorous site for contestation, development and improvement.
Professional Duties
Rather than begin with a sketch of lawyers’ relationship with their clients
and its attendant responsibilities, it is instructive to start with the general
duties which are imposed on lawyers as one kind of professional in society.
Indeed, taking such an approach immediately unearths and challenges a
common, unspoken and false assumption in the literature and practice: that
lawyers enter into relationships with their clients on a clean slate. The fact
is that future clients are already owed a considerable range of duties as
non-clients and these are simply added when people become clients.
Although often overlooked and ignored, there are many duties which
1 See generally A. Hutchinson, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 1999) chs. 2 and 3.
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lawyers have independent of their relationship with clients. Like all
professionals, they owe a series of duties to the public at large, to
individuals with whom they have contact, and to their professional
communities and colleagues. These legal obligations and moral
responsibilities provide a backdrop against which the central relationship
between lawyers and clients can be better understood.
Apart from any specific contractual obligations that lawyers assume in
their commercial dealings with others, there are several tortious and
equitable duties that lawyers might owe people and organisations at large,
as well as a number of moral responsibilities which lawyers assume as
qualified legal professionals. As a general rule, lawyers can owe a duty to
a third party (even if that party is represented), but there is understandable
reluctance to impose such a duty if the third party is adverse in interest, as
this may dilute and/or hamper the lawyers’ duties to their own clients.2
Nevertheless, the courts have been prepared to go as far as imposing a
fiduciary duty on lawyers to non-clients in some situations. For example,
in a real estate transaction, it was held that a purchaser’s lawyer could owe
a fiduciary duty to the vendors because they were unrepresented and the
lawyer knew or ought to have known that the elderly and unrepresented
vendors were or might be relying on him to protect their interests.
Expressly stating that this decision was not based on the existence of an
implied retainer, the judge stated, “though fiduciary responsibilities
normally arise from an existing contractual relationship of solicitor and
client, the contractual tie is not essential.”3 Again, a lender’s solicitor will
have a fiduciary duty to a borrower’s spouse to ensure that he or she
receives independent legal advice where that person is unrepresented and
unfamiliar with legal matters.4 Accordingly, while there are circumstances
in which lawyers will be placed in a fiduciary relation with a non-client,
this will usually only arise as corollary of an existing lawyer-client
relationship with an associated other.
Nevertheless, it is the potential tortious duties of lawyers which loom
largest in any discussions of legal responsibility to non-client others. While
it is unlikely that lawyers will be in Donoghue-like situations where they
will be at risk of causing personal injury or property damage to others, they
will frequently be in situations where they might cause economic losses to
others in performing their lawyering functions. As with other
professionals, like accountants and financial advisers, lawyers have some
2

See Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170, [1989] S.C.J. No. 86.

3 Tracy et al. v. Atkins (1977), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 46 at para. 27, (B.C.S.C.), Rattan J.

This
decision was upheld on the narrow ground of negligence in Tracy et al. v. Atkins (1979),
195 D.L.R. (3d) 632 (B.C.C.A.).
4 Shoppers Trust Co. v. Dynamic Homes Ltd. (1992), 96 D.L.R. (4th) 267 (O.C.J.).
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vulnerability to non-client others as a result of offering negligent advice or
misrepresentations. The general rules for negligent misstatements require,
among other things (e.g., misleading representation, detrimental and
reasonable reliance, etc.) that there exist a “special relationship” between
the professional and the affected party. While this will obviously
encompass clients, it can also extend to others: foreseeability and
proximity are the standard requirements for imposing a duty of care on
advice-givers. For instance, in Hercules, the Supreme Court of Canada had
to decide whether and when accountants who perform an audit of a
corporation’s financial statements owe a duty of care in tort to shareholders
of the corporation who claim to have suffered losses in reliance on the
audited statements: the shareholders were not the clients of the
accountants. Although it was held that there was no liability on the
particular facts, as the actual use of the audit information was not
reasonable, the Court was of the view that a “special relationship” can
clearly exist between professionals acting for the corporations and its
shareholders.5
In addition to liability for negligent misstatements, lawyers can also be
considered to owe substantial duties of care in regard to the services they
offer. This is most apparent in regard to wills and estates, but can also
extend to other areas, such as contract. For instance, in White, it was held
that the children of a testator could recover against their father’s lawyers
because they negligently failed to act on his instructions to include the
children in his will. While the court was at odds over the basis of this
liability, there was no doubt that the lawyers did owe a duty of care to the
disappointed beneficiaries, even though they had no formal or contractual
relation. The extent of that liability to non-clients is far from settled, but
the courts do not seem to have been hindered by lack of any particular
reliance by the non-clients on the negligence.6 Accordingly, lawyers
cannot assume that, even where there is no knowledge of the possible
future benefit, non-clients will have no claim against lawyers. Put more
affirmatively, lawyers should be aware that their negligence might well
have repercussions beyond the confined ambit of the lawyer-client
relationship.
5 See Hercules Managements Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 165. See also
Queen v. Cognos, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 87. In some provinces, the common law has now been
extended by legislation in some securities-based situations. Lawyers can be held liable as
“experts” for disclosing false or misleading information in secondary markets “without
regard to whether the [investor] relied on the misrepresentation.” See, for example,
Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 at Part XXIII.1.
6 See White v. Jones, [1995] 2 AC 207, [1995] 2 W.L.R. 187 and Hill trading as RF Hill
& Associates v. Van Erp (1997), 188 C.L.R. 159, 142 ALR 687 (H.C.). On the Canadian
position, see Whittingham v. Crease & Co. (1978), 88 D.L.R. (3d) 353 (B.C.S.C.).
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As regards professional duties, lawyers can by no means be said to
hold no particular ethical obligations to non-clients. Although the rules
leave no doubt that lawyers’ function is to be “openly and necessarily
partisan” (IX, c.17), there is the general requirement that “the lawyer’s
conduct toward all persons with whom the lawyer comes into contact in
practice should be characterized by courtesy and good faith” (XVI).7
While the requirement of “good faith” cannot be said to impose a fiduciary
duty to “all persons with whom the lawyer comes into contact,” it does
demand that lawyers do not treat non-clients “as if they were barbarians
and enemies.”8 This is no longer, if it ever was, an acceptable or ethical
way to proceed. A preferable approach is to note that, although a legal
professional should exhibit “a special care for the interests of those
accepted as clients, just as his friends, his family, and he himself have a
very general claim to his special concern,”9 a lawyer must still show a
general care to and for others. Indeed, the professional rules state that a
lawyer must, among other things, be “accurate, candid, and comprehensive”
with unrepresented adversary (IX, c.17); not take advantage of “slips or
oversights not going to the real merits” (IX, c.7); bring all legal authority
“directly in point” to the court’s attention (IX, c.2(h)); and not impose on
other lawyers “impossible, impractical or manifestly unfair conditions of
trust, including those with respect to time restraints and the payment of
penalty interest” (XVI, c.4). All in all, it is incumbent on lawyers to deal
with everyone with a genuine, if variable, sense of ethical integrity and
professional regard.
Current Affairs
A pivotal event in the imposition of ethical obligations and professional
responsibility is the occasion on which a person moves
into the status of a “client.” When the relation between lawyer and
others assumes the professional imprimatur of lawyer-client, it
establishes a whole set of obligations upon the lawyer toward the
client. The primary duties are that lawyers must be zealous partisans on
behalf of their clients, they must act with undivided loyalty and avoid
conflicts of interest, they must be entirely candid with their clients,
7 References in the text are to the Canadian Bar Association, Code of Professional
Conduct (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 2006) as adopted by Council, August 2004
and February 2006, online: <http://www.cba.org/CBA/activities/code>.
8 Charles P. Curtis, “The Ethics of Advocacy” (1951) 4 Stan. L. Rev. 3.
9 Charles Fried, “Lawyer As Friend: The Moral Foundations of The Lawyer-Client
Relation” (1976) 85 Yale L. J. 1060. While Fried’s general friendship analogy is sound,
Fried’s understanding of what it means to be a friend is disturbing because it more
resembles prostitution than anything else: continuing friendship is conditional on the
receipt of money and implies that friends are those who do whatever is asked of them
without comment or question.
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and they must give the highest confidentiality to their clients’
communications.10 Because of this crucial shift from general duties to
specific professional obligations, it is particularly important to be able to
recognise and establish the circumstances and conditions under which
such a relationship crystallises. In exploring this process of
crystallisation, it is vital that lawyers and commentators appreciate that
what counts as a “client” is about language as well as reality. It is not that
the label “client” describes some independent reality, but that it brings in
to play a whole collection of commitments and values, which shape as
much as they are shaped by the world. The status of “clients,” therefore,
is not fixed or objective, but depends on the objectives and outcomes
which the law and its regulators seek to achieve; these normative
ambitions will change as a result of the deeper forces and interests at
work in sculpting a legal and ethical regime which best matches the
conditions, demands and expectations of modern lawyering.11
It is generally assumed that the lawyer-client relationship is tied to the
existence of a written retainer. Indeed, the retainer will often stipulate the
formal and special terms that are to govern the working relationship
between lawyers and their clients. However, while the existence of a
retainer will be proof positive that a lawyer-client relationship exists, the
absence of such an agreement does not mean that the lawyer-client
relationship has not come into existence. In other words, lawyers can owe
a host of special responsibilities to persons even when they have not
obtained the elevated and singular status of “client.” Whether this preretainer phase is or is not part of the formal lawyer-client relationship is not
the main point. While lawyers will not necessarily have assumed in regard
to such persons all the composite duties owed to the client with whom they
share a retainer, they will have taken over certain obligations which are not
owed to the public at large. This crepuscular and shifting zone offers one
of the keenest challenges in mapping the terrain of lawyers’ professional
duties: the status of “client” is much less settled and uncontroversial than
many lawyers and commentators assume.
The preface to the CBA Code defines a client as “a person on whose
behalf a lawyer renders or undertakes to render professional services.” It is
far from clear what “undertakes” might mean, but it should not be treated
as only synonymous with a formal acknowledgement by means of a
written retainer. In particular, it would surely be imprudent for a lawyer
10 See generally Hutchinson, supra note 1 at 89-105. Of course, there are limits and
exceptions to these general duties.
11 For more on this taxonomic tendency in legal thought and doctrine, see A.
Hutchinson, It’s All In The Game: A Non-Foundationalist Account of Law and Adjudication
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2000) at 65-77.
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who meets with a prospective client, but determines not to undertake to act
as that person’s lawyer for a variety of reasons, to consider that they owe
no duties to that person over and above what they owe to everyone else
with whom they come in contact. By agreeing to meet with persons, they
must be considered to have impliedly assumed certain duties of
confidentiality towards them and to “render professional services.” While
the Code states that “the lawyer owes a duty of secrecy to every client
without exception, regardless of whether it is a continuing or casual client”
(IV, c.5), this duty should be considered to extend to the “might-be client.”
Moreover, while this might-be client relationship would certainly occur if
the meeting or conversation took place in the lawyer’s office, I would
suggest that this obligation can arise even in settings which are far less
formal or official. The lawyer who chats (unadvisedly) to people about
legal matters when those persons know that they are chatting with a lawyer
is surely under a duty to keep any information or communication
confidential whether that conversation takes place at a party, in public or
anywhere else. Of course, the more informal or “casual” the situation is,
the easier it will be for lawyers to insist upon and rely on a general
disclaimer of liability.12 In some situations, the duty of confidentiality
might extend to keeping the identity of the client confidential. This will
only arise in special circumstances where the client goes to the lawyer in
order to preserve their anonymity. For example, where a person has
committed a criminal offence and wants to seek advice before turning
themselves over to the authorities, the lawyer would be under an obligation
not to reveal the identity or whereabouts of the person, unless there is a
possibility that the client is likely to commit further offences.13
An important corollary to this question of when a person becomes a
client is that any positive answer will have implications for the lawyer’s
law firm as well as the lawyer personally. It is generally accepted that all
members of the law office will be treated as being in a professional
relationship with the client and, therefore, will owe them the full range of
appropriate professional obligations; office staff will be obliged to respect
the clients’ claims to confidentiality and the supervising lawyer will be
12 For a waiver to be valid, several conditions must be met — full disclosure by the
lawyer to the clients; signed and detailed waivers, preferably after independent legal advice;
and a considered decision by the lawyers that they reasonably believe that they are able to
represent each client without adversely affecting the other. Accordingly, informal and
general waivers are not acceptable; waivers based on incomplete knowledge are not
acceptable; and, even if a valid waiver exists, lawyers must be prepared to defend their
decision to accept or continue the retainer as circumstances change. Knowledge, no matter
how well-informed, is not tantamount to consent. See Goldberg v. Goldberg (1982), 141
D.L.R. (3d) 133 (Ont. Div. Ct.) and Chiefs of Ontario v. Ontario (2003), 63 O.R. (3d) 335
(Sup. Ct).
13 See Thorson v. Jones (1973), 38 D.L.R. (3d) 312 (B.C.S.C.).
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liable for any breaches by such employees. This rule has particular and
wide-reaching implications for the lawyer’s professional colleagues. One
lawyer’s client is considered to be the client of all the firm’s lawyers and,
therefore, will be entitled to the same duties and obligations as the
circumstances allow: “it is the firm, not just the individual lawyer, that
owes a fiduciary duty to its clients.”14 For instance, clients in a Vancouver
office have claims to professional obligation against lawyers in Toronto
whom they will never meet and who might not even know of their
existence, let alone have any details or information about the clients’
business. As such, it is incumbent on law firms to have in place a process
and system whereby they can monitor the client base of the firm, and all
reasonable steps are taken to ensure that conflicts do not inadvertently arise
and that appropriate measures are taken to protect confidential
information.15
Nevertheless, it will not always be sufficient for law firms to have such
screening processes in place. In determining who is to count as a current
client and what ethical responsibilities are owed to them, the recent
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Neil has set off alarm bells in
large law firms.16 While this was a criminal case, it has definite and
genuine implications for the lawyer-client relationship generally. Indeed,
Neil is accepted by the legal community to have re-ignited the flame of
debate, and many now think that it has converted what were previously
thought to be “business conflicts” into “legal conflicts.” If the force of the
Neil decision is fully appreciated and followed, law firms would be
exposed to greater civil liability for conflicts. Moreover, the Neil decision
confirms that, while there are several policy factors at work in this area of
law, those of client autonomy and the ethical integrity of the legal
profession and system are much more important than lawyers’ choice and
mobility: the latter is only a cautionary limit to the former.
Neil was charged with fabricating divorce documents and defrauding
a trust company in his capacity as a paralegal. A firm had a lawyer-client
relationship (offering legal advice, not defending him) with Neil. At the
same time, it was representing persons who were adverse in interest to
Neil, namely a co-accused and one of the parties to the impugned divorce
transactions. Neil sought to have his ultimate conviction set aside on the
basis of the conflict of interest by the law firm. The Supreme Court of
Canada held that the law firm was in conflict and that Neil could proceed
14

R. v. Neil, [2002] 3 SCR 631 at para. 29, Binnie J.

15 See Ford Motor Co. of Canada v. Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt (1996), 24 B.L.R. (2d)

217 (O.C.J.) [Ford], and Chapters Inc. v. Davies, Ward & Beck LLP, [2000] O.J. No. 4973,
10 B.L.R. (3d) 91 (O.S.C.) [Chapters].
16 Supra note 14.
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against them civilly or through the Law Society. However, it held on the
particular facts that there was no abuse of process sufficient to quash Neil’s
trial and order a re-trial. In his judgement for the Supreme Court, Justice
Binnie explored the question of “what are the proper limits of lawyer’s
duty of loyalty to a current client when there is no issue of confidential
information involved?” He was unequivocal that the duty of loyalty is
much broader than duty of confidentiality. However, he conceded that an
appropriate balance among competing interests is required because “an
unnecessary expansion of the duty may be as inimical to the proper
functioning of the legal system as would its attenuation.”17
Justice Binnie (a former Bay Street lawyer) held that there should be
no room for doubt about counsel’s loyalty and dedication to the client’s
case. In particular, he cast doubt on whether “ethical screens” will be
sufficient in regard to the affairs of current clients by including the aside
that “whether this belief [in the efficacy of “ethical screens”] is justified in
the absence of informed consent from the clients concerned is an issue for
another day.” He emphasised that there is a fiduciary relationship between
lawyer and client and that, approving of Lord Millett’s statement in
Bolkiah, “a fiduciary cannot act at the same time both for and against the
same client, and his firm is in no better position — without the consent of
both clients, [a firm] cannot act for one client while his partner is acting for
another in the opposite interests.”18 Although Justice Binnie stated that “in
exceptional cases, consent of the client may be inferred” (e.g., banks and
small unrelated briefs against the bank), he was clear about the basic force
of a lawyer’s duty of loyalty:
The general prohibition is undoubtedly a major inconvenience to large law partnerships
and especially to national firms with their proliferating offices in major centres across
Canada. Conflict searches in the firm’s records may belatedly turn up files in another
office a lawyer may not have been aware of. Indeed, he or she may not even be
acquainted with the partner on the other side of the country who is in charge of the file.
Conflict search procedures are often inefficient. Nevertheless, it is the firm not just the
individual lawyer, that owes a fiduciary duty to its clients, and a bright line is required.
The bright line is provided by the general rule that a lawyer may not represent one client
whose interests are directly adverse to the immediate interests of another current client
— even if the two mandates are unrelated — unless both clients consent after receiving
full disclosure (and preferably independent legal advice), and the lawyer reasonably
believes that he or she is able to represent each client without adversely affecting the
other.19
17

Ibid. at para. 15.
at para. 27. See Bolkiah (Prince Jefri) v. KPMG (A Firm), [1999] 2 A.C 222
at para. 37, Lord Millett.
19 Supra note 14 at para. 29.
18 Ibid.
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Accordingly, it is clear that, after Neil, there are now two legal regimes
for conflicts — one to cover “current clients” of the law firm and one to
cover “former clients.” While that governing the former is much more
exacting than that controlling the latter, there is still a strong case to be
made that the fiduciary relationships between lawyers and clients and the
corollary duty of loyalty prevent lawyers from accepting or continuing
retainers where there are conflicts between the interests of the client and
other current and former clients. Indeed, after Neil, it appears clear that
lawyers should only agree to represent two clients where and when those
clients’ interests are not directly adverse to each other. This is the case even
if the two mandates are unrelated. There is little guidance as to what
amounts to “directly adverse.” If the jurisprudence on conflicts generally
is a guide, it will be sufficient if there is a possibility, not a probability of
there being an adversity of interests.20 However, it is very likely that the
burden will be on lawyers to demonstrate that their clients’ interests are not
directly adverse because the lawyers are the ones who will be in the best
position to know all the relevant factors. As Lord Upjohn in an earlier case
put it, this means that “the reasonable man looking at the relevant facts and
circumstances of the particular case would think that there was a real
sensible possibility of conflict; not that you could imagine some situation
arising which might, in some conceivable possibility in events not
contemplated as real sensible possibilities by any reasonable person, result
in a conflict.”21
In most situations, it is possible for lawyers to represent concurrent
clients, even if conflicts exist, provided that there is a valid waiver from the
client. For a waiver to be valid, several conditions must be met — full
disclosure by the lawyer to the clients; signed and detailed waivers,
preferably after independent legal advice; and a considered decision by the
lawyers that they reasonably believe that they are able to represent each
client without adversely affecting the other.22 Accordingly, while lawyers
can waive a variety of conflicts, it cannot be done by informal and general
waivers (i.e., agreements which waive all future conflicts in all situations)
and by waivers based on the provision of incomplete knowledge to the
clients. Moreover, even if there is a formally valid waiver, lawyers must be
prepared to defend their decision to accept or continue the retainer as
meeting a reasonable standard of professional judgement. As regards socalled business conflicts between a current client and a former conflict, the
law and professional rules are much less clear. Nevertheless, it seems that
20

See MacDonald Estate v. Martin, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1235, [1990] S.C.J. No. 41.

21 Boardman v. Phipps, [1967] A.C. 46 at 124, [1966] 3 All E.R. 721 [Boardman cited

to A.C.].
22 See Moffat v. Wetstein (1996), 135 D.L.R. (4th) 298 (Ont. Gen. Div.), (sub nom.
Moffat et al. v. Wetstein et al.), and Chiefs of Ontario v. Ontario, supra note 12.
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the reasonable lawyer or law firm should inform clients of any potential
business conflicts before the retainer is concluded or after any potential
conflict comes to light as the representation progresses. This disclosure
should be sufficient to place clients in the best position possible to evaluate
whether they wish to retain or continue with the lawyer or law firm. In such
circumstances, it is the general fiduciary duty rather than any particular
conflicts doctrine that will be in play; it is unlikely that a formal waiver,
following independent legal advice, will be required.
Gone, But Not Forgotten?
That persons are no longer “current clients” does not mean that lawyers
have no obligations towards them. Lawyers have a number of continuing
and general duties that persist after the lawyer-client relationship has
ended. For instance, it is axiomatic that the duty of confidentiality
“continues indefinitely after the lawyer has ceased to act for the client,
whether or not differences have arisen between them” (IV, c.5) and may
bind even after the client has died.23 However, more contested issues of
legal ethics arise in regard to conflicts of interest. For instance, almost all
the cases dealing with conflicts involving former clients are concerned
with claims by the former client to prevent lawyers acting against them in
future transactions or litigation. While clients simply want to have the
lawyer disqualified, the claim is framed in terms of confidentiality; it is
contended that lawyers should not be permitted to use confidential
information and knowledge obtained while the former client was a client
in order to benefit a new and present client for whom the lawyer is now
acting. If lawyers act against former clients in “related matters,” two
rebuttable presumptions are considered to be in play — that confidential
and relevant information was passed between the lawyer and the former
client, and that lawyers in the same firm do share information which might
prejudice former clients unless there is “clear and convincing evidence that
all reasonable measures were taken to ensure no disclosure will occur.”24
In most circumstances, it will be sufficient for lawyers to demonstrate that
the law firm has in place “ethical screens” in order to rebut these
presumptions. Of course, these devices must be sophisticated, wellmonitored and effective.25
While there is now general consensus on the appropriate scope of
lawyers’ duties towards former clients, there remains very real debate
about the circumstances in which persons or organisations cross the ethical
rubicon separating current clients from former clients. There is little
23

See Guay v. Societe Franco-Manitobaine (1985), 37 Man. R. (2d) 16 (Q.B.).
See supra note 20.
25 See Ford and Chapters, supra note 15.
24
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established doctrinal guidance as to when this occurs. However, it will not
necessarily be determined by reference to whether a particular transaction
or retainer has come to an end. This is especially the case with large
corporate or institutional clients who might not have any particular set of
files in an active state, but who have a number of law firms working for
them and who have not yet given any definitive or final indication of
whether they have permanently shifted their business to another law firm.
Consequently, even if a law firm is no longer actively doing work for or
billing a person or institution, the court might still consider them a current
client for the purposes of the professional rules. Of course, as so much
hangs on whether a particular client is considered “current” or not, it will
be important to establish some instructive guidelines on when that shift in
status occurs. Indeed, lawyers would be well-advised to treat clients as
current clients unless they have clear and compelling evidence to the
contrary.
The recent case of Strother is a cautionary tale for all lawyers who
might consider relying on technicalities and playing fast and loose with the
idea of who their clients are and the extent of their duties to them. The
plaintiff corporation carried on business in tax-assisted production services
financing (TAPSF) for the film industry and retained Strother to act as a
tax shelter advisor; there was a written retainer agreements for consecutive
one-year terms in 1996 and 1997 which gave Strother a special fee
arrangement in return for his exclusive services. In 1998, legislative
amendments brought an end to TAPSF tax shelters. In response to
enquiries from the corporation, Strother advised it that no remedies were
available and that tax sheltered financing was at an end. A short time after
the expiry of the written retainer agreements, but while Strother and his
law firm were still engaged in the performance of legal work for the
corporation, Strother and a former employee of the corporation obtained a
favourable advance tax ruling on a potential exception to amendments to
the Act which would permit resumption of some forms of TAPSF. They
secretly proceeded to exploit that exception and generate substantial
profits. The corporation brought an action for damages, accounting and
disgorgement of profits for breach of Strother’s fiduciary duty and duty of
confidentiality to it. Although the claim was dismissed at trial, the Court of
Appeal ordered Strother to disgorge all profits to the corporation, even
though this was substantially more than the corporation itself would have
made if it had utilised the available tax exception for itself.26

26

3464920 Canada Inc. v. Strother, 2005 BCCA 35, [2005] B.C.J. No. 80, [2005] 5
W.W.R. 108 (on appeal to S.C.C.). The Court of Appeal went on to hold that Strothers’s
law firm was required to pay back any fees paid by Monarch after the retainer expired as
there was a direct conflict of interest, but it was not jointly and severally liable.
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The basis of the lawyer’s defence was that the retainer agreement to
provide advice to the corporation concerning TAPSF had ended before his
personal initiative to obtain and act upon the favourable tax ruling. In
rejecting this claim, the court insisted on the strictness and persistence of
the lawyer’s fiduciary duty, especially in regard to conflict of interest.
Emphasising that the lawyer-client relationship can continue after a
retainer agreement has expired and that fiduciary duties “are implied by
law and are unlikely to be validly excluded or diminished by contract,”
Newbury JA concluded:
the duty of a solicitor, like any other fiduciary, to advise his client of the existence of a
conflict of interest ... may continue even after the solicitor’s retainer has terminated. In
Allison v. Clayhills (1907), 97 LTR 709, [1904-07] All E.R. Rep. 500 (Eng. Ch. Div.),
for example, Parker J. held that a solicitor’s fiduciary duty will last as long as his
‘ascendancy’ over the client can operate, and thus may require full and proper disclosure
of his interest in any transaction between himself and his client ‘long after the
relationship of solicitor and client in its stricter sense had ceased to exist.’ (at 502.) This
principle was approved by the Privy Council in McMaster v. Byrne, [1952] 1 All E.R.
1362 (Ont. P.C.), a case on appeal from Canada, and was applied in Korz v. St. Pierre
(1987), 43 D.L.R. (4th) 528 (Ont. C.A.), at 637-38.27

The upshot of Strother is that, while lawyers are not prevented from
working for competitors in all circumstances and that clients will at some
point move from “current clients” to “former clients,” the fiduciary duties
owed by lawyers will linger for some time after a retainer has formally
come to a close. On the facts of Strother, it would seem that there was a
clear breach of loyalty as the lawyer took active steps to deceive the client
and to actively hide his machinations from it. Nevertheless, the gist of the
decision is that the courts’ refusal to draw hard and fast lines around the
process by which a client moves from “current” to “former” should put
lawyers on guard against treating clients too hastily as “former clients”
and, therefore, having reduced responsibilities towards them. Accordingly,
although the duty of loyalty is limited to current clients, the definition of
who counts as a “current client” is expansive and protean. Again, the
growing tendency of courts and regulators to move from an exclusively
formal analysis of professional obligations to a more substantive inquiry of
lawyers’ ethical duties represents an important change in attitude.
Organisational Clients
As the character of transactions and litigation becomes less individual and
for profits secretly made by Strothers. See 3464920 Canada Inc. v. Strother, 2005 BCCA
35, [2005] B.C.J. No. 80, [2005] 11 W.W.R. 399.
27 Ibid. at paras. 23-24.
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more institutional, the question of who it is that counts as the lawyer’s
“client” is also potentially more problematic — From whom does the
lawyer take instructions? To whom is a duty of confidentiality owed? What
is to be done if the group members disagree? Whose interests count in
determining conflicts? These questions receive short shrift in the
professional rules. The most that is stated is that lawyers represent “that
organisation acting through its duly authorized constituents” and must
make it clear to all such constituents that the interests of the organisation
are paramount to those of any constituents who become “adverse” in
interest (V, c.16). This rule is based on the notion that lawyers do not
represent the interests of the people involved, but the artificial entity of the
organisation they form, whether it is a corporation or a loose association.
The problems with this notion are many. In particular, there are two
important implications that warrant comment. First, this brief reference
reflects the law and lawyers’ concentration on individual autonomy; even
when there are group interests at stake, they are treated either as reducible
to one individual-like conglomerate interest or they are simply treated as
separate interests whose combination does not change the nature of the
interests represented. Secondly, there is an assumption that the client group
will remain constant when, in fact, it might begin to change as a result of
what the lawyer does or suggests. There are three general situations of
representation in which these difficulties arise in terms of client identity —
corporations, unincorporated associations, and class proceedings.
As regards corporations, while it is clear and undisputed that the
corporation itself is the client for the purposes of the lawyer’s ethical
obligations, it remains less settled as to how this relationship is
operationalised and what the impact on different individuals of this
professional relationship between lawyer and corporation is. Indeed,
mindful of the number of corporate clients served by modern lawyers,
being able to negotiating the thicket of potential problems that can arise
in such corporate situations is a matter of some importance and
controversy for lawyers. As a general matter, it can be stated that
lawyers’ paramount obligation of allegiance is to the corporation itself
and not to any of its officers, shareholders, employees or other connected
person (V, c.16). Corporate lawyers are well advised to obtain express
clarification in their retainers about which individuals have authority to
instruct them on the corporate client’s behalf. While they may assume
duties to the corporation’s agents, their duties to the corporation are
paramount and, if there is a conflict, the duty to the corporation must
prevail. Moreover, lawyers should inform agents of the corporation that,
in the event of a conflict of interests, they will be representing the
corporation as a whole and that individual agents should seek
independent representation (V, c.5 – c.8).
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Special difficulties arise in dealing with confidentiality in the context
of corporate lawyers’ professional responsibilities. Canadian courts have
tended to give the lawyer-client privilege a broad ambit of operation. For
instance, in Mutual Life, it was decided that the company’s lawyer was not
obligated to hand over to Revenue Canada at its request on an audit most
documents that were in the lawyer’s possession.28 As well as granting
privilege to all legal communications between the lawyer and the
management and employees of the company, the court extended
confidentiality to all legal communications between the lawyer and
employees of a wholly-owned subsidiary as the management of the two
companies was very closely connected. Privilege also extended to
communications about law in foreign jurisdictions and to documents
exchanged between other employees that commented on privileged legal
communications. However, in line with the traditional doctrine,
communications between the lawyer and management or other employees
about business matters were not privileged nor were documents simply
received and filed by the lawyer if they were not directly related to legal
matters. Accordingly, corporate lawyers must make it clear when they are
giving legal as opposed to non-legal advice.29
Nevertheless, there are circumstances in which lawyers might owe
duties directly to those persons who instruct them on behalf of the
corporation. In Gainers Inc., a law firm acted for a corporation, which was
controlled by one person. There was close contact between that person and
a particular lawyer of the law firm that represented the corporation.
Subsequently, that person ceased to control the corporation that brought an
action against him. The corporation then rehired the law firm to act for it.
Because the individual claimed he was a former client, he moved for an
order disqualifying the firm as being in a conflict. The Alberta Court of
Appeal held that there was no simple rule to govern cases of this sort. The
risk of undue harm to the former controller must be assessed in the
circumstances of each case. However, if there is the real possibility of harm
to that person and he or she had a reasonable expectation of confidentiality,
some minimal ethical obligations towards the corporation’s instructing
person would have crystallised even if there was no strict lawyer-client
relationship.30 The line between clients and non-clients was significantly
28 See Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Canada (Deputy Attorney-General),
[1988] O.J. No. 1090, 28 C.P.C. (2d) 101.
29 Alfred Crampton Amusement Machines Ltd. v. Commissioners of Custom and
Excise (No.2), [1972] 2 All E.R. 353 (UK CA).
30 Gainers Inc. v. Pocklington (1995), 125 D.L.R. (4th) 50 (Alta. C.A.). It was held
that, in view of the close contact between the lawyer and instructing individual, it would be
improper for that person to be personally cross-examined by the lawyer with whom he had
special contact. In Rosman v. Shapiro (1987), 653 F. Supp. 1441 (S.D.N.Y.), a lawyer was
prevented from representing a corporation when one of only two shareholders takes over
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and justifiably smudged in such corporate situations; substantive justice
was placed ahead of technical categorisation. Accordingly, corporate
lawyers must be assiduous in ensuring that all persons involved are not
only advised of their likely future rights, but also that certain non-clients
are afforded basic ethical and professional respect.
If the control of the corporation shifts, it will be the new controllers
who will determine what is in the corporation’s best interests; the right to
waive earlier privileged communications lies with the new controllers, not
the earlier ones. However, the lawyer’s duties are to the corporation
generally and not only to any incumbent control group. The duty of
corporate lawyers to shareholders will depend on the size of the company
and the number of shareholders. For example, in derivative proceedings,
shareholders may bring an action on behalf of the corporation against the
alleged misconduct of those controlling directors and officers who
normally instruct the corporation’s lawyer.31 While such derivative
proceedings do not automatically require separate representation, lawyers
should advise all interested parties to the conflict of the risks and remind
everyone that the lawyers’ primary responsibility is to the corporation.
Directors and officers not named in the allegations of impropriety can
retain and instruct counsel on behalf of the corporation. If this is not
feasible, the court can assign independent counsel to represent the interest
of the corporation.
The terrain becomes even more murky when the situation of
unincoporated associations or organisations is considered. The scope for
confusion is exacerbated by the fact that there is no separate legal entity to
be served as in the case of corporations, and there is no fixed or established
set of interests to be promoted or protected. The law tends to characterize
these organizations as unitary “entities” or “legal persons” and to suggest
that lawyers’ duties to such clients are analogous to their duties to
individual clients. In fact, however, these organizations consist of multiple
individuals with potentially differing interests, and hence they are prone to
internal conflicts that do not arise in individual representation.32 For
instance, lawyers who represent tenants’ groups or environmental action
committees must be careful to ensure that members are aware of their
respective rights and responsibilities as between the group and the lawyer.
While the professional rules simply state that lawyers acting for such
organizations can represent their constituents, as long as they are in
the corporation and the other sues.
31 See Vadeko International Inc. v. Philosophe (Gen. Div.) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 87
(G.D.), [1990] O.J. No. 2010.
32 William H. Simon, “Whom (Or What) Does the Organization’s Lawyer Represent?:
An Anatomy of Intra-Client Conflict” (2003) 91 Cal. L. Rev. 57.
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accordance with the rules and commentaries concerning conflicts of
interest (V, c.16), they must be assiduous to avoid a variety of “intra-client”
disputes in regard to what interests are to be zealously advocated, what
conflicts of interests might occur, and the zone of confidentiality which
applies. This is potentially treacherous territory for the ethical lawyer and,
again, lawyers would be prudent to take a very generous and flexible
definition of who counts as a “client.”
Finally, there are freshly-minted challenges of class action litigation.
As class proceedings begin to accelerate in size and reach, the ethical
responsibilities of class counsel have come under closer scrutiny. It will
come as no surprise that how traditional legal ethics rules and guidelines
are to be modified and applied to class action litigation is far from settled
or straightforward. Indeed, even at first glance, it is clear that conventional
assumptions and expectations from the lawyer-client context cannot
simply be transplanted to class proceedings. The central difference in class
actions as opposed to traditional litigation is the potential and often
genuine antagonism between class members and representative plaintiffs.
While it is obvious that the representative plaintiff is clearly a client of
counsel, it is the relationship between class counsel and the class which has
begun to raise problems. Also, this relationship will have implications for
the ethical dealings between the representative plaintiff and class counsel.
The rules of professional conduct are almost silent on how ethical
challenges, like confidentiality and conflicts, are to be dealt with in the
context of class actions. As Deborah Rhode sums up the situation,
“asymmetries between class interests and preferences will often force
counsel to function more as a Burkean trustee than instructed delegate.”33
Nevertheless, although rather tentative and delayed, the courts are
beginning to make some headway in clarifying the ethical issues in play
and proposing some possible guidance to class counsel’s dilemma of how
to balance the competing claims on their fiduciary attention.
As regards class counsel’s ethical obligations towards the
representative plaintiff, it can be safely reported that the basic duties of
professional responsibility from the traditional lawyer-client situation can
be relatively easily grafted onto the class counsel-representative plaintiff
relationship. At least presumptively, there are the usual requirements of
confidentiality, competence, etc. However, it is the limits of those
obligations and the countervailing pressures from the client being a
“representative” litigant that causes problems. While these will be lessened
if the plaintiff is truly “representative,” it will be incumbent on class
counsel to explain the dynamics of class actions to the plaintiff and to
33 Deborah L. Rhode, “Class Conflicts in Class Actions” (1982) 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1183
at 1258.
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stress the extent to which the plaintiff exists in a representative as opposed
to purely personal capacity. In particular, class counsel would be well
advised to notify representative plaintiffs of their potential liability for
costs in the event that the action fails. Also, there is the possibility of a
conflict of interests between class counsel and the representative plaintiff
when there is an early and perhaps premature settlement of the class action;
class counsel should likely advise the representative plaintiff to obtain
independent legal advice so as to ensure that the settlement is fair and not
only to the financial advantage of class counsel.34 However, it will be what
the substantive nature of class counsel’s relationship with class members is
considered to require which will most tellingly impact upon what the
representative plaintiff can ethically expect and demand from class
counsel.
The relationship between class counsel and class members is very
much sui generis and, as such, warrants its own special rules; it is ill-suited
to the black-and-white imperatives of the traditional lawyer-client
relationship. Because the professional societies seem unwilling or unable
to grasp the nettle, it has been left to courts to tackle this challenging
situation. The response has tended to hinge upon the pre- and postcertification stage of class proceedings. As a general rule, it can be reported
that judges expect class counsel to have very few ethical obligations to
class members before class certification. As Nordheimer J. stated:
…it seems to me that it is indisputable that a solicitor and client relationship must exist
between counsel for the representative plaintiff and the members of the class once the
membership of the class has been fixed. At that point, counsel for the representative
plaintiff is clearly counsel to the class as certified with all of the duties and obligations
that arise under a solicitor and client relationship with respect to the class members,
including the obligation to represent the class members ‘resolutely and honourably.’35

Nevertheless, this blunt conclusion must surely be qualified by at least
two more subtle caveats. As regards the pre-certification stage, while class
counsel does not stand in a formal lawyer-client relationship with class
members and owes them no formal duties, it is reasonable to suggest that
class counsel is not free to treat class members as only and entirely nonclients. It is better to consider them to be potential and/or quasi-clients such
that there will be some minimal obligation to class members at least to
ensure that they act competently and fairly towards the class, especially in
reaching settlements, and that they respect the confidentiality of
34

See generally Michael Carabash, Ethical Conduct for Class Counsel in Ontario
(April, 2006) (paper on file with author).
35 Ward-Price v. Mariners Haven Inc., 71 O.R. (3d) 664, [2004] O.J. No. 2308 at
para. 7.
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communications with the class. In short, it behoves class counsel to
consider and act with integrity towards the interests of class members
when dealing with the representative plaintiff; the full force of fiduciary
duty will be reduced, but not abandoned completely.36 Secondly, as
regards the post-certification phase, it would seem that, while class counsel
has assumed a fuller and more formal set of ethical obligations towards
class members as clients, the primary force of their professional
responsibility on a day-to-day basis is still to the representative plaintiff.
Moreover, because class counsel have assumed a greater menu of ethical
obligations towards class members, they must be aware of potential
conflicts between members and, where appropriate, recommend that
separate sub-classes be formed and separate counsel be appointed in some
circumstances.
Conclusion
Despite Arthur Conan Doyle, Sr.’s revered status, contemporary lawyers
would do well to ignore his observation that “a client is a mere unit, a
factor in a problem.” This might be well and good for the sleuth or others.
For lawyers, the ethical and legal ramifications which flow from the
characterisation of persons or institutions as “clients” is much more fraught
and freighted. Indeed, it seems incumbent on lawyers to treat their clients
as moral entities who are worthy of respect for that reason alone. Clients
may well be “units” and they might often be “problems,” but lawyers
should treat them with the moral respect and ethical integrity which their
status as moral beings recommends; talk of clients as “units” or
“problems” is antithetical to a rigorous legal ethic. Law may well be a
business, but that does not necessarily entail an unethical or unprofessional
approach to conducting that business. Moreover, and perhaps as
importantly, lawyers should be prepared to accept a wider and less
traditional view of who counts as a “client” or, at least, to recognise that
ethical responsibilities do not begin and end with the client. As not only
courts and professional bodies, but also society at large, begin to expect
more of lawyers, it would be prudent for lawyers to take much more
seriously the ethical responsibilities of their professional roles.
By developing a broad-ranging professional modus vivendi which was
less determined by formal categorisations, lawyers might be able to move
beyond the on/off world of lawyer-client relationship. While it is clear that
lawyers must and should put their clients’ interests first, this does not mean
that they should not or need not take into account the interests of others.
36 This seems to be the dominant American position. See City of San Jose v. Superior
Court (1974), 12 Cal. 3d 447, 525 P.2d 701, (sub nom. City of San Jose, v. Superior Court
of Santa Clara County; Lands Unlimited, et al., Real Parties in Interest).
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Nevertheless, even if the other party has little or no legal representation,
lawyers are legally obliged and morally required to be more concerned
with the interests of their clients. The duty to be a zealous partisan in the
pursuit of clients’ interests involves the prioritizing of clients’ interests, not
the obliteration of everyone else’s. This is the very opposite of an
appropriate and honourable ethic for professional lawyers. Other interests
still count, but for less. For instance, there seems to be little or no reason
for lawyers to facilitate their clients’ efforts to harm deliberately another’s
interests, especially if such actions would not improve the situation of their
clients. Lawyers’ social responsibilities are not exhausted or fulfilled
simply by advancing the interests of their clients. And, most importantly,
acting in the best interests of clients should not be an excuse or pretext for
acting unethically towards others. Lawyers have some duties that go
beyond and above the welfare of their clients.
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